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AMERICAN STRATEGY 
TOWARD GLOBAL GOVERNANCE. 
NEW LEADERSHIP OR CRISIS OF IDENTITY? 
Contemporary American grand strategy must respond to a variety of changing contexts: the intercon­
nectedness of various international actors, the fragmentation of economic systems, the diminishing 
ability to control international flows and the transnational threats permeating across borders. The 
United States, as a leading force of the international community, is now being forced to seriously 
address an emerging set of global problems. It seems that many areas are so inherently international 
that not only the American government, but all governments have to pool their vaunted sovereignties 
because the dangers of uninhibited enterprise are so great in a “global commons. ” In these circum­
stances, the United States should take an active part in establishing the instruments and conditions 
for effective global governance, although sustaining American engagement in the maintenance of 
world order is likely to become a more difficult task in the twenty-first century. 
The American nation was not only born free and proud, but as Robert Keohane 
remarked in one of his articles, it was also “born lucky. ”1 Behind the country’s rapid 
economic development stood values that supported risk-taking, entrepreneurship, 
competitiveness, a sense of mission and pragmatism. Furthermore, national creeds 
such as the pursuit of happiness and the freedom to shape the course of one’s life have 
strengthened many of these characteristics. The ideational factor of American identity 
- the nation’s sense of uniqueness - has also been a key factor in American political 
performance and this has determined how the political aims of the country have been 
defined and pursued. For these characteristics, alongside its efficiency and power, the 
United States has been as much admired as hated in the world. 
Robert O. Keohane. 1983. Associative American Development 1776-1850. In J. G. Ruggie (ed. ). The 
Antinomies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labor. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 90. 
Contemporary American grand strategy must, however, respond to a variety of 
changing contexts: the interconnectedness of various international actors, the frag­
mentation of economic systems, the diminishing ability to control international flows 
and the transnational threats permeating across borders. The United States, as a lead­
ing force of the international community, is now being forced to seriously address an 
210 III. Ideologia Americana or Americanism in Action: Foreign Policy
emerging set of global problems. It is no longer possible for it to concentrate on ad 
hoc political solutions and to focus on the immediate solutions to problems, instead of 
their underlying causes. It is to be expected that the new Democratic Administration 
will accelerate the process of building the capacities of the already existing architecture 
of global governance and promote U. S. leadership in sponsoring new, more effective 
initiatives around the world. The former Secretary of State and Nobel Peace Prize win­
ner Henry Kissinger expressed these expectations, anticipating that President Obama 
would, “... give new impetus to American foreign policy, partly because the reception of 
him is so extraordinary around the world. I think his task will be to develop an overall 
strategy for America in this period when, really, a new world order can be created. Its 
a great opportunity, it isn’t just a crisis. ”2
2 See: /http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KD3BqK-9ZiU/ Jan. 5, 2009.
3 The Commission is not an official body of the United Nations. It was, however, endorsed by the UN 
Secretary General Boutros Ghali. Chaired by Ingvar Carlson, the former Prime Minister of Sweden, and 
Shridath Ramphal, former Secretary General of the Commonwealth from Guyana, the Commission is 
made up of 28 public figures from around the world, all of whom participated in or formally endorsed 
the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. The Commissions membership list has 
included: Jimmy Carter of the U.S., Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, Boutros Boutros Ghali of Egypt and 
Maurice Strong of Canada.
Phrases such as “a new world order, ” “global governance, ” and “management of 
global issues” are increasingly being used to describe how the world is dealing with 
fundamental changes in the international system. The considerations which have led to 
a desire to rethink the international order are breeding global problems: environmental 
concerns, challenges of population growth and world poverty. These issues have led to 
a search for a global rather than merely international or multinational solution. They 
also reveal both the drivers and the effects of what is now commonly called “globaliza­
tion. ” It seems that many areas are so inherently international that not only the Ameri­
can government, but all governments, have to pool their vaunted sovereignties because 
the dangers of uninhibited enterprise are so great in a “global commons. ” In these 
circumstances, the United States should take an active part in establishing the instru­
ments and conditions for effective global governance, although sustaining American 
engagement in the maintenance of world order is likely to become a more difficult task 
in the twenty-first century. The need for a reformed system of global cooperation has 
never been more urgent, although the concept itself is far from new. Global governance 
as a paradigm has been associated with the new shape of international relations in the 
post-Cold-War period. The development started with the work of the UN Commis­
sion on Global Governance, established in 1992, to analyze global changes in recent 
decades and to suggest ways in which the international community can better cooperate 
on global issues. 3 In 1995 the commission presented its proposals for improving the 
machinery of global governance in light of the major changes in the world since 1945 
in a report entitled “Our Global Neighbourhood. ” The authors noticed: “At the global 
level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it 
must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Inter­
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acting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence.”4 It was also 
made clear that “global governance is not global government. No misunderstanding 
should arise from the similarity of the terms. We are not proposing movement towards 
world government, for were we to travel in that direction we could find ourselves in 
an even less democratic world than we have - one more accommodating to power, 
more hospitable to hegemonic ambition, and more reinforcing of the roles of states and 
governments rather than the rights of people.”5 It is not the ideal of one global govern­
ment which is being analyzed. The idea can be described as the capacity to order and 
steer international relations in desired directions and to manage international problems 
without recourse to organized violence. Since the 1990s, the debate about the global 
governance idea has continued, yet its definition still remains clouded in confusion. 
The phrase “global governance” is increasingly widely used, even though, according 
to the critics, the term is somehow connected with mapping which does not yet exist. 
They raise an argument that in public debate global governance “appears to be virtually 
everything.”6 On the other hand, it must be an important kind of non-existing phe­
nomenon, because the volume of literature dealing with the concept and its criticism 
is huge. Nevertheless, preoccupation with global change and the challenges emerging 
from this context have been major features in the field of international relations since 
the end of the Cold War.
4 Our Global Neighbourhood. 1995. The Commission on Global Governance, Oxford, http://actrav.itcilo. 
org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/globe/gove.htm - 20.05.2009.
5 Ibidem.
6 Timothy J. Sinclair. 2004. Global governance. Critical concepts in political sciences. Routledge: Taylor 
& Francis, 238.
7 Kenichi Ohame. 1990. The borderless world: power and strategy in the interlinked economy. London: 
HarperCollins; Matthew Horsman, Andrew Marshall. 1994. After the nation state: citizens, tribalism and 
the new world disorder. London: HarperCollins.
“ James N. Rosenau. 2002. Governance in a new global order. In David Held, Anthony G. McGrew. Govern­
ing globalization: power, authority and global governance. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 70.
The concept of global governance is used to describe certain developments and 
institutions beyond the state which try to regulate and control the new forces of glo­
balization. Thoughts on global governance have also been driven by other theoretical 
concepts created in order to describe directions and possible consequences for the 
changing world, for example the global economic network, the global information/ 
media system, intellectual technologies or the innovation factor. The global gov­
ernance idea is, in a way, a response to the emergence of complex multilateralism. 
Some prophets of globalization argue that the international system is developing so 
as to create a “borderless world.”7 In James Rosenaus famous vision the word “frag- 
megrative” is used to describe the complex dynamism of world politics.8 The word is 
a combination of “fragmentation” and “integration.” He made his statement in a very 
strict way, claiming that “we live in a messy world. (...) People are unsettled by the 
realization that deep changes are unfolding in every sphere of life, that events in any 
part of the world can have consequences for developments in every other part of the 
world, that the internet and other technologies have collapsed time and distance, 
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that consequently national states and their governments are not as competent as they 
once were In the aforementioned perspective the concept of global governance 
describes the efforts of the key international players, which try to regulate and control 
the new forces of globalization through international institutions, organizations and 
co-operative arrangements. Quite obviously the United States is one of the leading 
forces in creating the current shape of the international system. Therefore, whilst 
searching for the sources of global governance processes at the political level we 
cannot pass over the tremendous upsurge of idealism, much of it American, which 
accompanied the birth of a deeper transnational cooperation at the end of World 
War II and after the Cold War. It was motivation, hope and a specific political strat­
egy that underpinned the reconstruction of Europe and Japan in the forties and an 
international help project for the CCE countries in the nineties. The end of the Cold 
War opened various possibilities for rethinking the international system. At the same 
moment “the old system of global governance,” shaped by the global confrontation of 
the superpowers, fell apart. This old order was clearly dominated by the United States, 
which exercised its power in key functional areas, such as international trade and 
international security. After the end of the Cold War, unequivocal support for the Pax 
Americana resulted in the creation of an international economic order, in which lib­
eral trade held pride of place and international institutions were broadly accepted. At 
a certain moment this system was partially replaced by more differentiated attitudes of 
Western countries. It seems, at least from a European point of view, that in 2003 - by 
starting the war in Iraq - the United States became a lonely superpower. Neverthe­
less, even today, despite heavy economic problems and growing anti-Americanism, 
the state of international order heavily depends on how America decides to project 
its power and influence. Thus it is perhaps lonely, but still a superpower. Now, after 
the unilateral moment in American foreign policy has passed, the attitude of the 
United States will be among the most important factors in determining the shape of 
the new international order. As Samuel Huntington evaluated in 1999: “The United 
States would clearly prefer a unipolar system in which it would be the hegemon and 
often acts as if such a system existed. The major powers, on the other hand, would 
prefer a multipolar system in which they could pursue their interests unilaterally 
and collectively, without being subject to constraints, coercion, and pressure by the 
stronger superpower. They feel threatened by what they see as the American pursuit 
of global hegemony. American officials feel frustrated by their failure to achieve that 
hegemony. None of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with the 
status quo.”9 10
9 Ibidem, 71
10 Samuel P. Huntington. 1999. The Lonely Superpower. Foreign Affairs, March/April, vol. 78, no. 2,37.
An ongoing dilemma for U.S. policymakers is to find a good balance between 
Americas historic ambivalence towards multilateral cooperation and its need to estab­
lish a new model for global distribution of power. Joseph Ney uses the chess metaphor 
to express the complexity of the matter: “...distribution of power in politics today as 
analogous to a three-dimensional chess game. On the top board - military relations 
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among states - the world is, indeed, unipolar, and likely to remain that way for decades. 
But on the middle board of economic relations, the world is already multipolar, and the 
United States cannot obtain the outcomes it wants without the cooperation of Europe, 
Japan, China and others. And, on the bottom board of transnational issues outside the 
control of governments - including everything from climate change to pandemics to 
transnational terrorism - power is chaotically distributed, and it makes no sense at all 
to claim American hegemony.”11 Given the role that the United States plays in the main 
spheres conceptually and practically connected with the idea of global governance, its 
involvement in current changes is absolutely necessary. American-generated culture 
is globally pervasive and the engines of economic and technological development are 
mainly American. Much of the worlds population can be said to subscribe to a basic 
American concept of a constitutional government, respect for human rights and the 
rule of law. Elements of American identity are now global in their reach, and the coun­
try plays a leading role in areas crucial for global government. To name just a few of 
the spheres:
11 Joseph S. Nye. 2007. American Foreign Policy after Iraq. San Francisco Chronicle, March 14, http://goliath. 
ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4364819/Managing-the-global-problems-created.html - 21.05.2009.
12 Term invented by Marshall McLuhan, who noticed that “the world has become compressed and elec­
trically contracted, so that the globe is no more than one village,” M. McLuhan. 1964. Understanding 
Media. New York: Mentor, 4.
13 Mark Tremayne. 2007. Blogging, citizenship, and the future of media. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, XIII.
The concept of a global village - a concept which captured popular imagination as 
early as the sixties.12 The idea has been co-opted over the course of a few decades by 
politicians, businesspeople, and academics to illustrate their particular worldviews. In 
the core of this intellectual trend there is a conviction that the increased cross-cultural 
contact facilitated by computer networks will reduce cultural distance, making the 
world an “electronic global village.” The USA, being indisputably the world’s number 
one technology exporter and media trend creator, stands in the centre of this profound 
technological and information change. The headquarters of the world’s largest media 
conglomerates are located mainly in the United States. The American Cable News 
Network is the most commonly cited example of the new era of global information. 
American formats of television have literally set the frame for media production in 
other countries and information is not only presented in the American way but also 
interpreted in accordance with American viewpoints. Even though the era of Ameri­
can cultural imperialism has passed, its influence over the world’s information system 
remains. Technology is bringing cultures and journalism styles closer together. Even 
in the development of free Internet communication and information networks, events 
connected with American political life are considered to be milestones. The Clinton- 
-Lewinsky scandal in the late 1990s marked the birth of online journalism, and the 
terrorist attack in 2001 started a real wave of political commentary in blog form.13 In 
the second case especially, the Internet provided a uniquely immediate, decentralized, 
interconnected channel for the communication of images, comments and informa­
tion. Millions of Americans, alongside citizens of other countries, debated emerging 
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political, ethical and security concepts through this channel. It is worth noticing that 
the modern information system is designed for the needs of the main group of users: 
international professionals who base their opinions on CNN, Newsweek and other 
mainstream media. Their world views and behavior are somehow created according to 
a common pattern. They are participants in a global liberal economic culture, whose 
lingua franca is English, and the symbols of which, trademarks, are recognizable 
everywhere in the world. The United States, as the leader of communication technol­
ogy, has strongly influenced the shape of today’s information channels and the quality 
of its information content.
Global civil society is one of the most potentially influential ideas that is on the 
rise today. It is the vision of a transnational forum for debate and an action-oriented 
network able to influence the framework of global governance, strictly connected with 
the information revolution. The Internet era has empowered networks and private 
institutions to play direct roles in world politics, both as complements to international 
institutions and as substitutes for them. The development of communication tech­
nology has enabled the existence of a global public sphere, where noninstrumental 
communication can take place. With the changing subject matter of global politics 
come changing goals and governing models, thus the twenty-first century is shaping 
up as an era in which citizens, social entrepreneurs, and volunteers join forces to solve 
problems. The new media, communication technology and governance models are 
transferring unprecedented power to a variety of transnational social organizations and 
movements.14 The number of non-governmental organizations operating internation­
ally (INGOs) has grown rapidly in recent years (see Table 1).
14 A corollary to advocacy networks and social movements is the rise of transnational illicit organizations 
motivated by political goals (Al Quaeda) or simple international crime networks (Mara Salvatrucha).
15 John Keane. 2003. Global Civil Society? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5.
Several million people are engaged in numerous projects of this sector, which dis­
burses more money than the United Nations.15 These networks are concentrated within 
a few areas, such as the environment, human rights and progress in the developing 
world. All of these spheres are truly global, influencing peoples lives today and the 
future of nearly all societies. NGO and advocacy networks represent the new quality of 
transnational actors: they act as diplomats who, in contrast to government members, 
represent constituencies that are not bound by territory but by common values. The 
rise of transnational threats necessitates new forms of international cooperation and 
the realm of formal, interstate politics is widening. As the problem-solving capacity 
of existing international institutions is in many areas not effective, accountable or fast 
enough to resolve global dilemmas, they are handled partly and increasingly by civil 
society’s many operating agencies (see Table 2).
Global civil society, although still uncoordinated and divided, is likely to strengthen 
its position in the hierarchy of the world’s influential powers. Seen as an international 
public interests network, it can be surprisingly effective in managing global actions, 
but on the other hand it still faces many challenges. As a UNDP report pointed out: the 
global governance mechanisms are “too geographically unbalanced, dominated by the 
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largest economies (...). The structures and processes of global policy-making are not 
representative (...). There are no mechanisms for making ethical standards and human 
rights binding for corporations and individuals, not just governments.”16
16 Globalization with a human face. Human Development Report. 1999. New York/Oxford: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 8.
17 Charles W. Kegley, Eugene R. Wittkopf. 2008. World Politics: Trend and Transformation. Belmont, CA: 
Cengage Learning EMEA, 162.
18 The history of America’s involvement in building international governing bodies dates back to Woodrow 
Wilson, who thought up the idea of the League of Nations (although the United States never joined). 
After World War II the United States was deeply involved in the United Nations initiative. However, at
The “institutional channel” is the architecture of international decision-making 
which must address the most pressing threats and take advantage of opportunities, 
and is based on regional and global institutions and multilateral arrangements. Some 
critics argue that global governance is a product of elite Western interests, corporate 
standards and institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the World 
Bank. Others point out that despite the commonality of interests of its members, most 
of them remain quite passive and ineffective. The only truly global organization - the 
United Nations, a noble symbol of human concern and international solidarity - is 
considered today to be weak and lacking in legitimacy. Other crucial institutions 
of global governance - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have remained largely unchanged 
since the end of World War II. In face of growing economic, legal and environmental 
concerns, almost all the major international players are actively searching for any pos­
sible mechanisms of cooperation. In fact, many functions provided by international 
organizations are now being conducted by NGOs and INGOs, constantly growing in 
numbers (see Table 3). In order to deal with particular problems, states and others 
actors can also create an ad hoc arrangement. Another interesting form of coopera­
tion is represented by the World Commission on Dams, gathering representatives of 
governments, private industry and NGOs for the aim of establishing guidelines for 
decision-making on large dam constructions. In fact, apart from the main interna­
tional regimes based on international organizations, a rise of other forms of coopera­
tion can be noticed on the international stage. These various efforts at public, public­
private and global governance are not well-organized, but they are all based on regular 
interactions across national boundaries of governmental and nongovernmental actors. 
As World Bank Vice-President for Europe Jean-Francois Rischard argues: “One thing 
is sure: global complexity [is creating a] global governance crisis, that will have to 
be solved through new ways of working together globally, and bold departures from 
old, trusted concepts.”17 States and organizations must relocate their power and bring 
old rules in line with new realities. Such needs and great hopes for a new model of 
global cooperation have been expressed in international power circles since the end 
of the Cold War. They have also been strictly connected with the American leadership 
and the country’s will to spread its political values across the world. It soon became 
clear, however, that although the United States was the first to create international 
organizations, it was also the first to forsake them.18 “Angry isolationism,” “unilateral 
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moment,” and “go-it-alone policies” have been the phrases defining the American 
strategy towards international cooperation over recent decades. The unwillingness 
of the former administration to be bound by any international treaties which might 
produce judgments unfavorable to American interests has led to the withdrawal of 
the United States from key international agreements.19 Although U.S. national interest 
will remain at the core of foreign policy under President Obama, his foreign policy 
strategy emphasizes diplomacy, multilateralism and cooperation. It seems that his 
vision of the worlds affairs is in accordance with global governance ideas provided 
that American leadership remains: “America cannot meet the threats of this century 
alone, and the world cannot meet them without America. We can neither retreat 
from the world nor try to bully it into submission. We must lead the world by deed 
and by example.”20
the end of the twentieth century, the United States was almost $1.8 billion behind in its U.N. dues. In 
Western Europe, the United States both encouraged and was pulled into the enduring NATO alliance 
as the key instrument of containment in Europe. Multilateralism was Americas preferred strategy for 
the reconstruction of the world economy. See: Edward C. Luck. 1999. Mixed Messages. American Politics 
and International Organization, 1919-1999. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
” Such as the Kyoto accords, the land mines treaty, and the International Criminal Court. On the other 
hand, concerning world economy, the Bush administration was as committed as prior U.S. administra­
tions to a multilateral approach to international trade negotiations (e.g. the Doha round) and to U.S.-led 
multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. There are also some signals suggesting that 
the US is increasingly adopting a more practical approach towards the International Criminal Court by 
acknowledging its role in the overall system of justice.
20 Barrack Obama. 2007. Renewing American leadership. Foreign Affairs, July/August, Council on Foreign 
Relations, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401/barack-obama/renewing-american- 
leadership.html - 20.05.2009.
Despite such political rhetoric the level of American involvement in creating a new 
model of global governance still remains uncertain. The United States is likely to adopt 
a more multilateral image in the years ahead, but the concept of global governance 
from an American perspective is still just a mere fantasy. On the other hand, American 
political concepts and identity have often been ahead of their time, and Americans are 
good at transforming fresh visions into reality. In the case of global governance, how­
ever, there are many reasons to suppose that the United States will not easily accept the 
necessity of subordination to any new global norms or supranational institutions. First 
of all, despite its recent declarations of intent, the United States is not a team player on 
the international scene. It is likely to remain an extraordinarily powerful country that 
perceives itself as both necessary to preserve world order and privileged to act ‘above’ 
world rules if necessary. The country’s longstanding tradition of exceptionalism has 
emerged from its vigilance in guarding its sovereign prerogatives from the perceived 
incursions of international bodies. In addition, many approaches which have emerged 
in the area of global governance do not fit easily into the conventional American view of 
its leading position on the world’s political stage. America, the global empire in a chang­
ing international system, somehow understands itself and its relations with the world in 
terms of assumptions formed at the end of the Cold War. Its behavior is determined less 
by imperial considerations than by concerns about its own domestic public opinion.
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In fact, the global governance project is seen as Americas “leadership” mission only 
among Americans and its supporters. The “unilateral moment” in American foreign 
policy over the last twenty years has resulted in the significant erosion of American 
soft power in most areas of the world. The world is still attracted to American values, 
but not American policy. Nevertheless, due to economic causes in the future, the inter­
national power order will probably be divided between great leaders such as China, 
India, Russia and the United States. The creation of a more effective framework for 
global governance will depend on a common agreement and an advanced level of 
cooperation among the world’s leading nations. The United States, however, despite 
its leading position in the global networks of wealth, information and power, shows 
growing concern regarding the preservation of its national identity in the changing 
system. American visions and actions have helped to create an interdependent world, 
but the United States very strongly retains its sovereignty. However, in the emerging 
global governance system, nearly all nations, including the United States, have to vol­
untarily forfeit some historic freedom of action to manage transnational threats and 
exploit international opportunities. It is not clear, however, what the American view 
on this matter is. Americans faced a severe crisis of identity after September 11th and 
the growing anti-American sentiments that followed the “War on Terror” campaign.21 
The terrorist attacks sharply punctuated the end of the American century. American 
identity, today more than ever, is one of clashes and disagreement over what the USA 
is and what it should be. In spite of current concerns, the world needs American 
leadership and its involvement in drafting the basis of the new model of international 
cooperation. It is now certain that without global cooperation, an effective, coherent 
mechanism of global governance, none of the universal issues can be tackled.
21 In his last book entitled Who Are We? Samuel Huntington asserts that American identity has become 
increasingly more obscure. He addressed the question in terms of what he calls “the American Creed,” 
which encompasses the values present in the debate that shaped America’s founding - “the essential 
dignity of the individual human being, of the fundamental equality of all men, and of certain inalien­
able rights to freedom, justice, and fair opportunity.” In Huntington’s view, America is undergoing 
an identity crisis in which the long-term trend points squarely towards national disintegration. See: 
Samuel Huntington. 2004. Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity. New York: 
Simon & Schuster.
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Table 1. Growth of NGOs, 1950-2005
Source: Union of International Associations and the OECD 2006a.




GRINGO Government regulated and initiated NGOs
BINGO Business and industry NGOs
DONGO Donor organized NGOs
DODONGO Donor dominated NGOs
ODANGO ODA (official development aid) financed NGOs




TSMO Transnational social movements
GSM Global Social Movements
Source: Margaret P. Kams, Karen A. Mingst. 2004. International Organizations: the Politics and Processes of 
Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Riennier, 18.
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Table 3. Growth Patterns of IGOs and INGOs, 1891-2004
Source: Yearbook of International Organization 1985-1986. 1992-1993, 1998-1999, 2003-2004. Brussels: 
Union of International Associations.
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